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Casenote
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-SECTION 1983,
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND UNIvERSY REGULATIONS:
ANY RELATIONSHIP? Esteban v. Central Missouri State College,

415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969).
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the college student and the university
has assumed added dimensions in recent years, and has been both
the focal point of repeated litigation and a source of comment in
legal periodicals. Historically, this relationship remained outside
the scope of judicial scrutiny, and colleges and universities were
left free to discipline and sanction students without a great deal
of judicial restraint or interference. This judicial abstention was
based for the most part upon theories of in loco parentis,l wherein
the courts viewed the university as acting in a fatherly, counseling function, or upon theories of contract law.2 In recent years
several courts have repudiated or ignored these earlier theories,
guaranteeing the student that, as a minimum, disciplinary action

taken against him will conform to procedures strikingly similar

to those observed in a criminal trial.3 Administrative officials of
1 See, e.g., Stetson University v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924);
North v. Board of Trustees, 137 Ill. 296, 27 N.E. 54 (1891); Anthony v.
Syracuse University, 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928).
2 Anthony v. Syracuse University, 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435
(1928); Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 A.
220 (1923).
3 The fountainhead of the procedural due process requirements in a
case involving a university disciplinary hearing is Dixon v. Alabama
State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961). Other courts have followed the Dixon precedent
and have required procedural due process, including, notice, the right
to a hearing, the right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses and
present testimony, the right to preserve a record, and the right to
appeal the decision of the disciplinary board. Barker v. Hardway,
283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 399 F.2d 638 (4th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969); Zanders v. Louisiana State
Board of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968); Buttney v.
Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Jones v. Tennessee State
Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 407
F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, - - - U.S. - - - (1969);
Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 613
(M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated as moot sub. nom., Troy State University v.
Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968); Hammond v. South Carolina
State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967); Wright v. Texas
Southern University, 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1967), af'd, 392 F.2d
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most colleges and universities and a rapid demise of disciplinary
autonomy in today's institutions of higher learning seems to be
4
occurring.
This judicial stimulus is closely related to the numerous constitutional innovations of recent years, and it may in turn precipitate
many more attacks against the "university establishment" by students who are dismissed for reasons which may seem, at least to
them, completely arbitrary. 5 Further conflict seems imminent in
today's educational system in which students are striving for personal recognition in the complex academic environment, advocating
both social reform and ever-increasing campus freedoms.
Numerous articles and commentators have expounded upon the
significance of college disciplinary sanctions in relation to the
student, and have argued adamantly for increasing the procedural
rights granted in disciplinary hearings.6 But while the procedural
728 (5th Cir. 1968); Due v. Florida A. & M. University, 233 F. Supp.
396 (N.D. Fla. 1963); Schiff v. Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Mich.
1966); Knight v. Board of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn.
1961); Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal.
App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d
56 (Fla. 1966).
4 See cases cited in note 3 supra. University administrators have traditionally viewed their autonomy as merely a continuation of the
counseling function and as such they have felt they should be given a
free rein to develop their respective institutions along lines most
conducive to the goals of the particular institution. When the administrative, disciplinary function is looked upon in this manner, i.e., as
mere guidance, it is argued that due process is totally irrelevant. See
Monypenney, University Purpose, Discipline, and Due Process, 43
N.D.L. REv. 739 (1967). This view overlooks the fact that the interests
involved are in reality conflicting, pitting the university against the
student. It seems anomalous to suggest that the interests represented
are in fact one and the same.
5 See note 3 supra, for some of the most recent cases involving university disciplinary hearings.
6 Johnson, The ConstitutionalRights of College Students, 42 TEx. L. REV.
344 (1964); Monypenney, University Purpose, Discipline, and Due
Process, 43 N.D.L. Rzv. 739 (1967); Seavy, Dismissal of Students:
"Due Process," 70 HARv. L. REv. 1406 (1957); Sherry, Governance of
the University: Rules, Rights, and Responsibilities, 54 CAL. L. REv. 23
(1966); Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic
Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. Rv. 290 (1968); Van Alstyne, The Student as a
University Resident, 45 DENvER L.J. 594 (1968); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
368 (1963); Note, The Scope of University Discipline, 35 BROOKLYN L.

REv. 486 (1969); Note, Reasonable Rules Reasonably Enforced--Guidelines for University Disciplinary Proceedings, 53 IVIIn. L. Rr-. 301
(1968); Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV.
1045 (1968); Comment, The College Student and Due Process in Dis-
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guarantees are wisely and rapidly being adopted by most colleges
and universities across the nation, other problems loom on the
horizon- These problems raise serious questions concerning the
effectiveness of these procedural guarantees, the courts' role in the
interrelationship between the student and the university and university regulations which attempt to proscribe first amendment
activities. One case bringing these problems into focus is the recent
decision by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Esteban

v. Central Missouri State College7

In Esteban, two students brought ail action in federal district
court to enjoin their suspension from Central Missouri State College, asserting jurisdiction under the civil rights laws.8 Both had
been suspended, based in part upon their "participation" in demonstrations which began on the public streets adjacent to the university campus and subsequently overflowed onto campus streets
and sidewalks.9 The students were suspended after a disciplinary
hearing. The students alleged that they had been denied procedural
due process; the court agreed, and they were granted a new hearing.10 On rehearing, the students were again suspended, and for a
ciplinary Proceedings, 13 S.D.L. REv. 87 (1968); Comment, School Expulsions and Due Process, 14 Km. L. Rav. 108 (1965); Note, Private
Government on the Campus--Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963); Symposium, Student Rights and
Campus Rules, 54 CAT.. L. REv. 1-174 (1966).
7 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969).
8 Jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 (1964), and
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (1964). The court granted jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 415 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th
Cir. 1969).
9 Some of the damage included broken school building windows and
destroyed shrubbery. In addition, eggs were thrown, the Dean of Men
was hanged in effigy and his "dummy" was set on fire. Traffic was
halted, cars were rocked, and some of the occupants were ordered
out into the street. The President of the college termed the activity
as a "riot which blocked traffic on a state highway which caused considerable damage on the campus which had the citizens of Warrensburg very much worried with all the noise and turmoil that was
caused." 290 F. Supp. 622, 625 n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
10 Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo.
1967). In the initial disposition, the district court was very explicit and
unequivocally stated that by directing that a new hearing be granted
with procedural safeguards, it did not mean that a formal court type
judicial hearing as required in criminal cases was required, since the
precise nature of the notice and hearing will vary in each case. The
critical defect of the first hearing, in the court's view, was the inclusion on the determining board of a person to whom the students were
permitted to make their showing. Id. at 651. Each plaintiff was granted
a new hearing on the charges which the school desired to press, and
the school was ordered to follow certain procedural features: "(1) a
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second time filed a motion to enjoin enforcement of their suspension. The district court dismissed their complaint with prejudice",
12
and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
The result in Esteban is significant as it is demonstrative of the
problems alluded to above, namely, the role of the federal district
court in proceedings challenging university autonomy and disciplinary action, and the pragmatic effectiveness of procedural due process in light of university regulations.
II. PROBLEMS PRESENTED UNDER SECTION 1983
The district court recognized that in actions under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,13 the issues considered are limited to a determination of
written statement of the charges to be furnished each plaintiff at least
10 days prior to the date of the hearing; (2) the hearing shall be
conducted before the President of the college; (3) plaintiffs shall be
permitted to inspect in advance of such hearing any affidavits or
exhibits which the college intends to submit at the hearing; (4) plaintiffs shall be permitted to have counsel present with them at the
hearing to advise them; (5) plaintiffs shall be afforded the right to
present their version as to the charges and to make such showing by
way of affidavits, exhibits and witnesses as they desire; (6) plaintiffs
shall be permitted to hear the evidence presented against them, and
plaintiffs (not their attorney) may question at the hearing any witness
who gives evidence against them; (7) the President shall determine
the facts of each case solely on the evidence presented at the hearing
therein and shall state in writing his findings as to whether or not
the student charged is guilty of the conduct charged and the disposition to be made, if any, by way of disciplinary action; (8) either side
may, at its own expense, make a record of the events at the hearing."
Id. at 651-52 (citations omitted).
An argument would seem to be available to these students, or to
future students, with respect to the sixth procedure enumerated, that
is, that only plaintiffs, and not their attorney, could question the
witnesses. Since counsel is not allowed to function properly, it could
be asserted that the students were denied the effective assistance of
counsel. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
right to counsel is totally meaningless and no more than "an illusion, . . . unless counsel is given an opportunity to function." Kent

v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966). The procedure adopted and
approved in Esteban would seem to be no more than a ritualistic
gesture, completely at odds with the constitutional requirement.
11 Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo.
1968).
12 Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969).
13 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964): "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress."
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whether a student has been deprived of constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities under color of state law. 14 Unless there has
been a deprivation of due process, or invidious discrimination, a
denial of other constitutional rights, or clearly arbitrary action,
federal courts should not interfere with the disciplinary process
relevant to a lawful mission of the university. 15
It would seem that the district court considers these actions de
novo. Yet, it is not entirely clear from the court's language, approved by the court of appeals, that this is true, 16 especially in light
of the dissent in the court of appeals. The court arguably suggests
that the district court must rely upon the determination by university officials that there was "substantial evidence" upon which
the sanction was based, which means in essence that they are
relying upon the disciplinary board's factual determination. The
problem presented at least on the surface by this language is obviated in Esteban, since counsel for both sides specifically adopted
the "findings of fact." This language is confusing, however, with
respect to future cases which may arise. 17
Obviously the district judge may not ignore the "evidence" used
by the disciplinary board against the student in making its "findings of fact." The extent to which these "findings" may be used,
or to what extent they are binding on the judge in federal court
is unclear. Although these "findings" should not be conclusive, they
14 Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 628 (W.D.
Mo. 1968).
15 Id. at 631.

16 The court states that "[a] federal district court will in appropriate

17

circumstances review a student disciplinary proceeding to determine
if the challenged disciplinary action was on grounds lacking support
by substantial evidence." Id.
For example, in a future case, counsel for the university might argue
that the university was justified in disciplining the student based upon
the facts presented to the disciplinary board, and under this language
assert that the district court must confine its determination of the issue
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to review of the facts upon which the disciplinary board made its determination. Thus the district court should
be precluded from examining other factors not brought out at the,
time of the hearing which may have significant ramifications if considered by the court. In light of the function of the court under section
1983, that is, to determine if the subject of the constitutional attack
did infringe upon constitutionally protected rights, it is submitted that
such an argument is a correct interpretation of the court's function in
such a proceeding. It is the determination made by the disciplinary
board, based upon certain particular facts, which allegedly has infringed upon protected constitutional rights, and other factors, although relevant to the actual process of sanctioning the student, would
seem totally irrelevant to the determination of whether the proceedig, as conducted, infringed upon the student's rights.
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are of substantial importance as they do in fact constitute the subject of the constitutional attack in most disciplinary cases. The hearing, based upon these "findings" has caused the injury; it is upon
these findings that the determination must be made as to whether
the student should be "punished." If these findings do not support
disciplinary action, or if they support that action only at the expense of infringing upon constitutionally protected rights, then it
seems clear that the findings upon which the sanction is based
should be given considerable weight in a section 1983 proceeding.
Federal courts should not arrogate to themselves an appellate
power of review over the internal, educational affairs of an institution of higher learning. However, a disciplinary proceeding, challenged under section 1983, should not be classified as educational. 18
It is based upon certain determinations made by the administrative
officials, and if that determination has infringed upon constitutionally protected rights, then the findings, as well as the ultimate determination, are quite clearly subject to review by the federal district court. Indeed, this is the very issue which the court must consider. In this view, then, it is submitted that the district court did
not misconceive its function as the dissent suggests.
ll. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
IN LIGHT OF REGULATIONS
The procedural safeguards afforded the students in Esteban
considerably expand those required in Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education, 9 the case most often cited for the requirement
of procedural due process in a college disciplinary hearing. It appears that while the full panoply of formal judicial procedures has
never been held to be required in any university disciplinary proceeding, the district court may have gone farther than any court in
20
extending procedural guarantees.
See note 4 supra.
19 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). The
court of appeals in Dixon held specifically that due process requires,
as a minimum, notice and some opportunity for a hearing before a
student at a tax-supported college can be expelled for misconduct.
Id. at 155. In dictum, however, the court further stated that in addition the student should have the names of the witnesses against him
and an oral written statement of the facts to which each testifies,
an opportunity to present a defense, the right to present witnesses in
his own behalf, and the right to a report open to the student's inspection containing the results and findings of the hearing.
20 See note 10 supra. The argument is well-founded that to require the
full panoply of procedural safeguards would seemingly obviate the
necessity for having the hearing before the university disciplinary
board in the first place, since the same results could be had, and the
student's rights could be better protected, in an actual trial.

18
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Many far-sighted college and university admi4istrators are
adopting the procedures suggested in Diron and subsequent cases
which establish at least an appearance of "fundamental fair-

ness." Additionally, many private universities, which present a
totally different aspect to the disciplinary problem under section
1983,21 are adopting such procedures. As important and revolu21

Private action, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful, is notsubject to the limitations imposed by the fourteenth amendment.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966). Successful attack of a disciplinary hearing instituted by a
private university would initially depend upon whether the, private
institution had acted pursuant to, or under color of, state law. Since
"state £ction"' and "acting under color of state law" are treated as
the same thing under the fourteenth amendment, United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966), section 1983 would be applicable.
There are several ways in which this state action concept may be
approached. One such approach is the indicia approach, that is, to
show a series of connections between the private college and the state
to support a holding of state action. It has recently been held that the
mere receipt of state funds for use by the private university is insufficient to support a holding of state action, Grossner v. Trustees of
Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and it is
submitted that this rationale is well-founded. Mere financial aid
without more does not establish an interdependence between the state
and the university. Creation pursuant to a state charter and tax
exempt status have also been held insufficient to support a holding of
state action. See Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969).
See also Powe v. Miles, 294 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D.N.Y. 1968), af'd, 407
F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968), where Alfred University was held not to have
acted under color of state law, even though it was incorporated under
New York law, received state aid, operated a ceramics college under a
state contract, and was subject to regulatory powers exercisable by
the state of New York.
A second approach is that the university is performing a public
function, and as such constitutes state action. This argument would
necessarily place considerable reliance upon such cases as Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
Regardless of the method of attack, one factor remains obvious,
that is, that heavy reliance must be placed upon the civil rights cases
which have preceded these attacks under section 1983. These cases
dealt directly with racial discrimination practiced by private associations, and they are distinguishable from the disciplinary proceeding
cases because the state is not directly involved in the subject of the
constitutional attack in the latter cases, that is, the disciplinary hearing.
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535, 548
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), citing, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. at 725. In the discrimination cases, the state involvement was
,found to be in the discrimination itself, which was the subject of the
constitutional attack. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
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tionary as these procedures may seem, however, their practical
value may be seriously questioned in light of Esteban. The broad
and vague nature of the regulations approved by the court, serving
as the basis for the expulsion, seems to indicate that regardless of
the procedures adopted, the regulation can be interpreted to cover
almost any activity, including those arguably protected under the
first amendment. In this respect then, the procedures are meaningless. College administrators are obviously aware that expulsion
imposed under a similar vague regulation proscribing unbefitting
conduct may be upheld by the courts, at least in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, if only the appearance of "fundamental fairness" is maintained.
In Esteban, the court upheld the challenged regulations2 2 on
several grounds. Initially, the court argued that the regulations
(1966); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Shelley v. Kraemer,

22

334 U.S. 1 (1948); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323
F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
The public function approach was recently rejected in Browns v.
Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969), on the ground that the public
function cases dealt only with the "delineation of public places for
purposes of First Amendment activities," and were in no way concerned with the internal affairs of the private institution. Id. at 596.
It is submitted, however, that a relatively sound analogy can be
drawn between the "community" involved in Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946), and the educational community involved on every
university campus, be it public or private. In a very real sense the
regulations governing such a community are the criminal law of the
campus, and sanctions may have a very significant impact on the
affected student. The university is much more responsible for ordering the lives of its residents than was the private organization involved
in Marsh. It should be noted that this argument should be used as but
merely one of the factors which a court should view when viewing
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the state's involvement
in the affairs of the private university.
The regulations in effect at the time provided in part: "The conduct
of the individual student is an important indication of character and
future usefulness in life. It is therefore important that each student
maintain the highest standards of integrity, honesty and morality. All
students are expected to conform to ordinary and accepted social
customs and to conduct themselves at all times and in all places in a
manner befitting a student of Central Missouri State College.
All students that enroll at C.M.S.C. assume an obligation to abide
by the rules and regulations of the college as well as all local, state
and federal laws. When a breach of regulations involves a mixed
group, ALL MEMBERS ARE HELD EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE. Conduct unbefitting a student which reflects adversely upon himself or
the institution will result in disciplinary action.
Mass Gatherings-Participation in mass gatherings which might be
considered as unruly or unlawful will subject a student to possible
immediate dismissal from the College. Only a few students inten-
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were not "the fulcrum of [the student's] discomfiture, '23 condemning the "childish behavior" of these students and the lack of
"common sense" in their defiance of proper university administrative authority.2 4 Although these statements do not in themselves
answer the question, the least palatable aspect of the decision is
the court's direct response to the vagueness allegation: that the
tionally get involved in mob misconduct, but many so-called "spectators" get drawn into fracas and by their very presence contribute
to the dimensions of the problems. It should be understood that the
College considers no student to be immune from due process of law
enforcement when he is in violation as an individual or as a member
of a crowd." Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077,
1082 (8th "Cir.1969).
23 Id. at 1088.
24 Esteban was charged with "contributing to and participating in an
unruly and unlawful mass gathering occurring... near [the College]
in that [he] did resist efforts of one Dr. M. L. Meverden in dispersing
said mass gathering, failed and refused to identify [himself] to
[Dr. Meverden] as requested and used vile and obscene language
towards and threatened a resident assistant of the College...." Roberds,
the other student involved in the suit, was "charged with contributing
to and participating in an unruly and unlawful mass gathering
occurring . . . near [the College]. . .

."

Roberds was also charged

with evidencing his intent to participate in the demonstration by
correspondence and by direct confrontation. Id. at 1081, 1082.
From this language it seems apparent that at least with respect to
Roberds, the disciplinary action was based primarily on his "participation" in the demonstrations. The president of the college specifically
determined that Roberd's presence at the demonstrations constituted
a violation of the regulation in question. See id. at 1093 (dissenting
opinion). The ramifications of such an interpretation are seemingly in
conflict with decisions of the United States Supreme Court which have
upheld the right to picket and demonstrate with respect to union
activity. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940). If the student may be punished just for being a spectator at a
"mass gathering," then it would seemingly conflict with these guaranteed rights. The regulation makes no distinction between violent and
non-violent mass gatherings; rather, it reserves to the College the
right to discipline any student for participation which might be considered unruly or unlawful. It may be argued that since there was
violence in this case, the majority was correct in its holding as applied
to these facts, having perhaps established the "clear and present
danger" test with respect to first amendment freedoms. Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). It may also be argued, at least in the
eighth circuit, that first amendment freedoms do not enjoy the same
"preferred position" on college campuses as required elsewhere,
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966), and that university regulations
may not have to meet the narrow specificity requirement of many of
the first amendment cases. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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regulation is not that difficult to comprehend, since it asks for
adherence to "standards which befit a student. '25 This, however, is
precisely the point: the regulation does not delineate nor even remotely suggest what those standards are.
The regulation is phrased in extremely broad terms,2 6 and the
student may only speculate as to what is prohibited activity. Concededly, flexibility rather than "meticulous specificity" is desirable
in university regulations, but it is quite clear that regulations requiring adherence to standards of "the highest ... integrity, honesty,
and morality," and adherence to standards of conduct "befitting a
student at Central Missouri State College," may be too flexible.
They do not in any manner inform the student as to what is prohibited conduct resulting in the adoption of the broadest possible
standard. The phrasing of the regulation in this manner necessitates
a determination of conduct not befitting a student at the college or
university only after the conduct has taken place, and is in this
sense an ex post facto determination.2 7 In this manner the regulation sweeps within its scope activities protected by the first and
fourteenth amendments, and forces the student to limit his activity
to that which is unmistakably safe from possible disciplinary
28
action.
A similar regulation was upheld in Goldberg v. Regents of the
University of California,29 which is perhaps even more broad than
the regulation involved in Esteban.30 Such regulations, regardless
of the judicial exposition in their behalf, clearly do not delineate
the limitations of prohibited activities; rather, they leave disciplinary action to turn upon what may be a seemingly arbitrary administrative decision. Such regulations are no more definite and clear
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th
Cir. 1969).
26 See note 21 supra.
27 The resulting harm is that the student is unable to discern possible
ramifications of his conduct, regardless of what it may be.
28 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
29 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
30 In Goldberg, the pertinent regulation provided that "[it is taken for
granted that each student ... will adhere to acceptable standards of
personal conduct; and that all students... will set and observe among
themselves proper standards of conduct and good taste .... This presumption in favor of the students . . .continues until, ... by misconduct, it is reversed, in which case the University authorities will
take such action as the particular occurrence judged in the light of the
attendant circumstances, may seem to require .... " Id. at 871 n.2, 57 Cal.
Rptr. at 466 n.2. Acceptable standards of conduct at Central Missouri
State College may be one thing; those same standards of conduct at
the University of California at Berkeley may be quite another.
25
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than the standard of "misconduct" recently condemned in Soglin v.
Kaufman.3 1 This is not to suggest that college regulations governing student conduct must meet the standard of conduct required of
criminal statutes in every respect. But it is no answer to say, as
the majority in Esteban does, that such regulations are not punitive
in nature but rather act as a part of the educational system. The net
effect of such regulations, the violation of which may result in the
student's suspension from the university, is "punishment" in the
sense that its consequences may prove to be ruinous to the individual in the same manner as a criminal conviction. 82 Both in terms
of economics and in terms of the social stigma attaching to university expulsion, a denial of the opportunity to obtain a university
education may indeed be of more significance than some criminal
convictions. 3 To assert that the regulations are not punitive is to
ignore the reality of the situation.
There can be no "question but that colleges and universities must
have the right, the inherent power, to maintain order and to discipline students. These normative orders are necessary to provide
an orderly atmosphere and an environment conducive to the pursuit of higher learning. But, as the district court in Esteban recognized, these rules and regulations which the institution seeks to
impose upon the student must be relevant to a lawful mission or
function of the university;3 5 they should not sweep within their
bounds protected activity "when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." 86 Precisely because the task of demarcating a line between protected and unprotected activity is most difficult, courts
should carefully scrutinize any regulation :Which might affect protected freedoms lest there be a tendency to over-react in some cases
and sweep aside constitutionally protected rights.
IV. THE MASS GATHERING REGULATION
The final aspect of Esteban deals with a separate regulation,
approved by the majority, which was the crux of the college's case.
The mass gathering regulation subjects a student to possible dis31 295 F. Supp. 973 (WD. Wis. 1968), affd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
32 See Sherry, Governance of the University: RuZes, Rights, and Re-

sponsibilities,54 CAL.L. REv. 23, 36-37 (1966).

33 Id.

34 Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Brooks v. Auburn
University, 296 F. Supp. 188 (E.D. Ala. 1969), aff'd, 412 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1969); Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281
F. Supp. 747 (E.D. La. 1967).
35 Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 629
(W.D. Mo. 1967).
38 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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missal for "[p]articipation

in mass gatherings which might be
.. -37 By interpretation, the regulation draws within the ambit of its proscription those individuals
who were merely spectators, as well as those who directly participated in the demonstration. One of the students in Esteban specifically challenged this aspect of the regulation, as the college president stated unequivocally that the regulation did sanction mere
presence at mass gatherings. 38 The district court found that the
president could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that
the student was a "participant" and not a mere spectator.39 However, this conclusion seems clearly erroneous in light of the statement by the president as well as additional observations made by
the district court which show that mere spectator status was sufficient to bring the student within the proscription of the regulation.40

considered as unruly or unlawful..

41
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
is cited by both the majority and the dissent for their respective
positions which are at odds with respect to the constitutional validity of the regulation. The majority first assumes that the regulation is valid when applying the language of Tinker, and then
assumes that the violent conduct which was absent in Tinker was
not only present in Esteban, but directly involved the students who
were before the court. The dissent attacks the regulation as a prior
restraint on the students' freedom, citing Tinker for the proposition
that no ban may be placed on "demonstrations simply because they
'42
may incite some students to unlawful acts.

The analysis of the dissent seems to be on firmer ground than
that of the majority. The difficulty with the regulation is that by
its terms it holds anyone at a mass gathering responsible for the
37
38

39
40

41
42

Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1082 (8th
Cir. 1969).
Id. at 1093 (dissenting opinion).
290 F. Supp. at 631.
The district court makes reference to statements made by the college
president which indicates that participation in the demonstration was
not necessary. These were considered as part of the substantial evidence: "(1) Earlier [Roberds] had inquired as to what would happen if
he were to be a participant. This is indicative of his interest in being
a participant. (2) He wrote a letter ... indicating he was considering
action not consistent with that of being a mere spectator. (3) He
witnessed the unlawful and destructive actions over a substantial
period of time on two evenings and did not withdraw and disassociate
on either of them from the unruly and destructive group." Esteban v.
Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d at 1091 (dissenting opinion),
quoting, 290 F. Supp. at 631.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
415 F.2d at 1095 (dissenting opinion).

CASENOTE
conduct of anyone else who may act in a violent or disruptive man-

ner, thus resulting in the erection of a subtle obstacle to those who
do have a sincere belief in peaceful protest and who do not
support the violent action taken by some students. By adopting this
regulation, the university has succeeded in stigmatizing and penalizing thought and speech of perhaps unpopular beliefs, a result
which has been clearly condemned by the United States Supreme
Court 3 The regulation also inhibits the right to peacefully picket,
which has long been recognized as protected under the first amendment,4 4 because of the possible disciplinary action which may result
for those students who merely attend a mass gathering. In most
instances involving a university campus demonstration, any picket
line would qualify as such a gathering and the regulation would
seem to have a chilling effect on the exercise of these freedoms.
V. CONCLUSION
Although procedural guarantees were implemented in Esteban,
the students were sanctioned on the basis of regulations which,
perhaps in other factual circumstances, would not have so readily
received the stamp of approval by the court of appeals. Any regulation prohibiting conduct unbecoming to a student at the college
or university can in no way be said to convey to the student the
nature of prohibited activity.4 5 Additionally, the mass gathering
regulation seemingly infringes upon the students' right to picket,
and as such would be in violation of the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.46
The right to discipline unruly students is unquestioned. But the
regulations proscribing that conduct which is prohibited should not
be so broadly drawn. There seems to be an inherent conflict between
the approaches of the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits with respect to the type of university regulations which
may be implemented, a conflict which, it is hoped, may soon be
resolved by the United States Supreme Court. In the interim, it
is submitted that college and university administration officials
should seriously consider implementing new regulations to avoid
the allegation of unconstitutionality. In the Eighth Circuit it would
not be absolutely mandatory. But a regulation which guarantees
to the student the right to protest and picket peacefully while specifically condemning violent activity, such as property damage,
43
44

Cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,

Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
45 See text accompanying footnotes 21 to 25 supra.
46 See note 42 supra.
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interference with ingress to and egress from campus facilities, prohibitions against student takeover of administrative facilities, and
the interruption of classes would clearly be within lawful limits,
and would avoid future problems which are certain to arise under
present law. The university must be granted the right to protect
itself, its traditions, and its property to assure the protection of
students and the continuity of the educational process. This right
should not, however, supersede the rights and interests of the students when the same end can ultimately be achieved by simply
adopting more specific regulations.
Roger M. Beverage '70

